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VOLUME XXI JUNE, 1937 NUMBER FOUR
THE PHILOSOPHY OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION
ROBERT J. BUER
THE HISTORY OF CONSIDERATION
T HE doctrine of consideration has stood for several centuries as a
pillar in the law of contracts, an essential to their enforcement.
Students of the law have, from the first instance of their contacts with
the great body of jurisprudence, regarded consideration as one of the
rudimentary principles upon which future knowledge of the refine-
ments and technicalities of the law must be based. However, in recent
years, chiefly because of the exceptions to and inconsistencies of the
fundamental rule that every contract to be enforceable must be sup-
ported by a sufficient consideration, liberal students of the law have
advocated the alteration or abolishment of the rule.' These advocates
of change in the doctrine are not without sound historical authority as
a basis for their demands. In the eighteenth century Lord Mansfield
developed the theory of moral consideration as the basis for an enforce-
able contract; as a next step, he suggested that consideration should
be only of evidentiary value as indicating a serious intention to become
legally bound; and further, that in a business transaction nudum pac-
'-For reference to some of these advocated changes see: Ashley, Doctrine of
Consideration (1913) 26 HARv. L. REv. 429; Ballantine, Is the Doctrine of
Consideration Senseless and Illogical? (1913) 11 MIcH. L. REv. 423, SELE
READINGS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1931) 588; Lorenzen, Causa and Con-
sideration in the Law of Contracts (1919) 28 YALE L. J. 621; Pound, AN
INTRODUcTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1925) 282-284; Wright, Ought the
Doctrine'of Consideration Be Abolished from the Common Law? (1936) 49
HARv. L. REv. 1225.
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turn could not exist if the agreement were in writing.2 However, the
conservatism of the English bar in the late eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries resulted in two decisions which stopped the liberalizing
influence of Lord Mansfield.3
The practical result of the activities of the present day liberals in
the field of consideration and of the attempts of Lord Mansfield along
the same line has been the position taken by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in two recent cases,4 wherein the court puts its stamp of approval
on the moral obligation doctrine, quoting liberally from Lord Mans-
field. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has taken a radical step in these
two decisions, it has departed from precedent, and what the ramifica-
tions of these decisions will be is a matter of conjecture.
And so it is with the practical object in mind of being able to better
understand the changes that are taking place in the doctrine of con-
sideration in Wisconsin and to draw some conclusions therefrom that
this paper is undertaken. This paper is divided into four major sec-
tions dealing with (1) the history of consideration; (2) the philosophi-
cal bases of contractual obligation; (3) the doctrine of moral consid-
eration in Wisconsin; and (4) a comment upon the future of the
doctrine.
The term consideration and the beginnings of the doctrine have
caused considerable difficulty to the law student. The doctrine of con-
sideration in the common law, even in the present day, is referable to
no particular theory of liability. "It presents a composite picture in-
cluding elements of reliance, bargain and equivalents, as well as a
large admixture of formality, based upon differing and to some extent
inconsistent theories.' ' 5 And so in order to understand the modern
trends of change in the rule of consideration, it is necessary to trace
the development of the doctrine in the common law.
Prior to the fifteenth century there were only two forms of com-
mon law actions which recognized in any manner the enforceability of
contractual obligations, and these did so only in a very limited degree;
2 Hawkes v. Saunders, 1 Cowp. 289, 98 Eng. Rep. 1091; Pillans v. Mierop, 3
Burr. 1663, 97 Eng. Rep. 1035 (1765).
SRann v. Hughes, 7 T.R. 350n(a), 101 Eng. Rep. 1014n(a) (1778) which over-
ruled the theory that nudwm pactwim could not exist if the agreement were in
writing; Eastwood v. Kenyon, 11 Ad. & E. 438, 450, 113 Eng. Rep. 482, 486
(1840) rejected the rule of moral consideration saying: "Indeed the doctrine
(moral consideration) would annihilate the necessity for any consideration at
all, inasmuch as the mere fact of giving a promise creates a moral obligation
to perform it."
4Park Falls State Bank v. Fordyce, 206 Wis. 628, 238 N.W. 516 (1932);
Elbinger v. Capitol & Teutonia Co., 208 Wis. 163, 242 N.W. 568 (1932).
5 State of New York, Legislative Document No. 65 (1936), Second Annual
Report of the Law Revision Commission, 91.
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the two actions were debt and covenant.6 If the attorney could not fit
his case under either of these two writs, the promise upon which his
action rested was nudum pactum. Because there were so many of these
unenforceable contracts based on promises which were not under seal
and which could not qualify as being the technical quid pro quo, some
new term had to be devised "to express the act or other circumstances
which had led up to or was the motive or reason for a given trans-
action. It is clear from the Year Books of the fifteenth and early six-
teenth century that the word 'consideration' was used for this pur-
pose." A new action evolved through which some of these parol
promises became enforceable; it was known as assumpsit. The rules of
consideration were developed from the procedural requirements of the
action of assumpsit, and so it is readily seen that by following the
development of assumpsit one is able to trace the early history of
consideration.3
6 (a) Debt. The action of debt could only be brought for a fixed sum in money
or for a fixed quantity of chattels due to the plaintiff, either under a real con-
tract, a statute, a record, judgment or specialty. Ames points out the theory
behind the action: "The judgment for the plaintiff is that he recover his
debt. In other words, as in the case of real actions, the defendant was con-
ceived as having in his possession something belonging to the plaintiff which
he might not rightfully keep, but ought to surrender. This doubtless explains"
why the duty of the debtor was always for the payment of a definite amount
of money or a fixed quantity of chattels." Ames, Parol Contracts Prior to
Assumpsit (1894) 8 HA~v. L. Ra. 252, 260, SELEcTED READINGS ON THE LAW
OF CONTRACTs (1931) 23, 29. In view of this theory it is easily seen why the
action of debt was never broadened to include the enforcement of executory
promises. The quid pro quo was an essential to a successful action of debt,
and that was always something which was executed or delivered. Some courts
have treated the modem doctrine of consideration as being synonymous with
the term quid pro quo. Justice v. Lang, 42 N.Y. 493, 1 Am. Rep. 576 (1870).
This is an erroneous idea. 6 R.C.L. 649
(b.) Covenant. The writ first appeared in the twelfth century. 2 Pollock
& Maitland, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1899) 216. It was a formal
contract action which would lie only upon a sealed instrument, although early
in the history of covenant there were some cases where written covenants
not under seal were enforced. State of New York, op, cit. supra note 5, at
95, 96. "It is curious and perhaps in a measure profitable to speculate for a
moment on the course of future development in English contract law, if the
parol covenant had been recognized. In that event our courts would certainly
have adopted substantially the whole Roman law of obligation. The need for
such a doctrine as that of consideration would not have been felt." 2 Street,
THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY (1906) 18. There does not seem to
have been any reason why the action of covenant should not have been
broadened to include suit upon a parol covenant, and it seems purely acci-
dental that a seal was required; that is to say, practically all the early cove-
nant actions dealt with land and that was probably the only reason why the
seal was soon registered as being essential to all covenants in order to come
within the scope of the writ. Pollock, Contracts in Early English Law (1893)
6 HARv. L. REv. 389, 400, SELECTED READINGS ON THE LAW OF CoNTRAcTS (1931)
10, 19.
78 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1926), 4.
3Holdsworth, The Modern History of the Doctrine of Consideration (1922)
2 B. U. L. REv. 87. Holdsworth says that "though the chief and most perma-
nent elements in the modern doctrine of consideration have sprung from the
procedural requirements of the action of assumpsit, many difficulties have
1937]
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As has previously been said, it is impossible to refer the doctrine
of consideration to any set theory. However, to quote Ames, "At the
present day it is doubtless just and expedient to resolve every consid-
eration into a detriment to the promisee incurred at the request of the
promisor."9 But, Ames goes on to say, such an easy definition was not
possible in the sixteenth century because at that time consideration was
divided into two classes: (1) detriment; (2) precedent debt. These
two types of consideration were developed separately: consideration
based upon detriment developed with special assumpsit; consideration
based upon precedent debt developed with indebitatus assumpsit.
Ames in his article on the history of assumpsitO' has made the
most thorough search in this field. Other noted authors have found the
early history of assumpsit too complicated to deal with and have
passed over it with but slight reference. 1 Ames divides his discussion
of special assumpsit into a discussion of four types of cases. "The
earliest cases in which an assumpsit was laid in the declaration were
cases against a ferryman who undertook to carry a plaintiff's horse
over the river, but who overloaded the boat, whereby the horse was
drowned; against surgeons who undertook to cure the plaintiff or his
animals, but who administered contrary medicines or otherwise unskil-
fully treated their patient; against a smith for laming a horse while
shoeing it; against a barber who undertook to shave the beard of the
plaintiff with a clean and wholesome razor, but who performed his
work negligently and unskilfully to the great injury of the plaintiff's
face; against a carpenter who undertook to build well and faithfully,
but who built unskilfully."' 12 These cases, as may be readily seen, are
not in any sense actions on contract, but because of the peculiar con-
ception of legal liability which then existed, the statement of an as-
sumpsit was considered essential. It was believed that a tort to be
actionable must be done by a stranger to the plaintiff and that the
plaintiff must in no way participate therein; that if the plaintiff author-
ized another to come in contact with his person or property, that then,
arisen in the process of translating these procedural rules into the rules of
the modern doctrine. These difficulties have arisen partly from the fact that
the action of assumpsit was constantly expanding all through the period; but
chiefly from the fact that other elements derived from other sources made
their influences felt. * * * We must reckon with the influences derived from
the action of debt, with the influence of the idea of consideration which was
being developed by the Court of Chancery, and, later, with the influence of the
Continental systems of law which came through the law merchant."
9Ames, History of Assumpsit (1888) 2 HARV. L. Rxv. 1, revised in 3 SELECTED
ESSAYS ON ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (1909) 259, SELECTED READINGS
ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1931) 33.
• Ames, loc. cit. supra note 9.
.n 8 Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 7, at 8, 9; Plucknett, A CONCISE HISTORY
OF THE COMMON LAW (1929) 412, 413.
3 Ames, History of Assumpsit, 3 SELECTED ESSAYS 260.
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if any damage was done, there was no tort, because the plaintiff, by his
authorization, assumed the risk. Therefore, a promise by the defendant
to do the work skilfully in the above cases was believed to be necessary
in order to shift the risk to the defendant. This peculiar notion of
legal liability having passed from the law, the allegation of an assump-
sit is no longer necessary in these tort actions, and hence there is little
in common between these actions and actions of contract." The second
class of cases are actions against bailees for negligence in the custody
of things entrusted to them. These actions also sound in tort, and, in
early times, it was also thought necessary to plead an assumpsit, a
promise on the part of the bailee to care for the goods in a reasonable
manner, before such bailee could be made to account for his negli-
gence; "all agreed that without such an assumpsit the action would not
lie." Today, the very fact of acceptance of the goods by the bailee
raises an implied promise upon his part to treat the goods entrusted to
him with care. Consideration played no important part in these cases
because liability was imposed regardless of whether the bailee had or
had not received a fee.' 4 The third class of actions in which an assump-
sit had to be pleaded was the action of deceit against a vendor of a
chattel upon a false warranty. This early deceit action sounded pri-
marily in tort; today, of course, a vendor may be held upon a false
warranty in contract, but such was not the character of the earlier
actions as may be seen when it is noted that in them there was no
reference to consideration; "if, by chance, alleged, it counted for
nothing." The necessity of alleging an assumpsit, however, is seen in
the leading case of Chandelor v. Lopus (1606-1607)1" wherein it was
held that the declaration was bad because the defendant vendor merely
"affirmed" instead of "warranted" a particular stone to be a bezoar
stone, when in fact it was not.'6
The fourth class of cases discussed by Ames, actions on the case
for deceit, is the most important to the modem history of considera-
tion. The count in the first of these cases read something like this:
"The defendant was to answer for that he, for a certain sum to be
paid to him by the plaintiff, undertook to buy a manor of one J. B. for
the plaintiff; but that he, by collusion between himself and one M. N.,
contrived cunningly to defraud the plaintiff, disclose the latter's evi-
dence, and falsely and fraudulently became of counsel with M. N.,
and bought the manor of M. N., to the damage of the plaintiff." It
was agreed that this action would lie. Here was finally a type of action
in which the defendant's acts did not affect the plaintiff's person or his
13 Ames, op. cit. supra note 12 at 260-262.
14 Ames, supra note 12 at 262-266.
' Reported in Woodward, CASES ON SALES (1933) 472.
'1 Ames, supra note 12 at 266-269.
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property, and yet recovery was given. The principle involved was, in
due time, applied to the case where the plaintiff had paid a sum for
lands which the defendant owned and the defendant had promised to
convey, but the defendant conveyed to another thus deceiving the
plaintiff. Still later, if the defendant, owning the lands, failed to con-
vey, and the plaintiff had already paid the sum agreed, an action on the
case for deceit arose for such nonfeasance7
So, finally, the action amounted to this: if there was a promise, on
the faith of which the plaintiff had parted with his money or property
or gave his labor, and the defendant broke that promise, relief was
given. 8 It made no difference that the plaintiff's property or money or
labor accrued to the benefit of some third party, the defendant was
still liable. So, from this is seen, that from the sixteenth century on to
the present day "a detriment has always been deemed a valid consid-
eration for a promise, if incurred at the promisor's request." 9 Prior to
1500, the court of equity had given relief to the plaintiff who had
suffered a detriment because of the defendant promisor. Ames seems
to think that this was a patent influence in bringing the common law
judges to the point of allowing the action of assumpsit."'
By the end of the fifteenth century it had become clearly established
that nonfeasance was actionable where the plaintiff had parted with his
money, goods, or services in reliance upon the defendant's promise.
The plaintiff, in these actions, had parted with his money relying upon
the defendant's promise, or he had "suffered some charge," that is, he
had given his goods or labor. Such conditions were easily reconcilable
"7 Ames, supra note 12 at 269-276.28 Plucknett, A CoNcISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 408.19 Ames, supra note 12 at 273-274.
21 There are, however, other theories of the origin of consideration. Justice
Holmes seems to think that "the requirement of consideration in all parol
contracts is simply a modified generalization of quid pro quo to raise a debt
by parol." Holmes, Early English Equity, 2 SELECTED ESSAYS 705, 717. He
makes one exception-that is, a surety may bind himself, even though he re-
ceives no quid pro quo. Ames makes slight comment upon this theory, but it
seems patent that the very exception noted admits of the detriment idea as
propounded by Ames.
Salmond expounds the theory that "consideration is a modification of the
Roman principle of causa, adopted by equity, and transferred thence into the
common law." Salmond, The History of Contract, 2 SELECTED ESSAYS 320,
336. Plucknett, however, points out that although there still is evidence of the
effect of chancery's adoption of the Roman principle of causa in the com-
mon law cases that such "refuse to fit in the with any general theory of con-
sideration." Plucknett, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW (1929) 414.
Jenks, in refutation of Salmond's theory, says: "There was at one time a
theory that valuable consideration owed its origin to the influence of Equity.
Anything more unlike an equitable doctrine it would be impossible to con-
ceive; although * * * Equity did not refuse to adopt it in cases to which it
had already been applied by the courts of Common Law. To have done other-
wise would have been to open a feud between the two jurisdictions upon a
fundamental principle of wide application." Jenks, A SHORT HISTORY OF ENG-
LISH LAW (1913) 298.
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with the formula of quid pro quo used in the action of debt. "It is of
course true that quid pro quo in the action of debt was regarded from
the point of view of a benefit received by the promisor, while in as-
sumpsit the quid pro quo is rather a 'charge,' that is to say, a detri-
ment, to the promisee. This distinction was too slight to overcome the
convenience of having one formula which would fit both actions." (It.
sup.)22
It must be remembered that up to this time debts created by simple
contract were not easily enforced. The action of debt was unsatisfac-
tory for this purpose for many reasons,2 and so a new form of action
had to be devised: this new action was later known as indebitatus
assumpsit. The situation was something like this: suppose a man
already owed a simple contract debt and he subsequently promises his
creditor that he will pay it, which promise he breaks. In this situation
is seen the elements which might make it possible to fit a creditor's
action under either of two writs; that is, the debtor might be liable
to an action of debt; but he has also made a promise which he has
breached, a deceit upon the plaintiff creditor, which might give rise
to an action of assumpsit. "Consequently, we find a new variety of
assumpsit appearing in the middle of the sixteenth century called
indebitatus assumpsit in which the plaintiff declares that the defendant
being already indebted (indebitatus) undertook (assumpsit) to pay a
particular sum."2' However, the defendant's express promise, if de-
nied, had to be proved, and if it was not, the plaintiff lost his case.
The Court of Queen's Bench during this period (from 1589 to Slade's
Case in 1603) applied a more liberal rule: if the plaintiff proved the
simple contract debt, a subsequent promise or assumpsit was implied.
This implied assumpsit rule was not followed by other courts, however,
until Slade's Case was decided.
22Plucknett, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COmMON LAw 408. This quotation
demonstrates the looseness with which the phrase quid pro quo is used by
writers.
23 Thepleadings in debt had to be extremely accurate, giving every small detail,
while in indebitatus assumpsit, as it later developed, all that was necessary was
to allege the general nature of the indebtedness, and that the defendant being
so indebted promised to pay. Here is found the origin of the common counts.
Ames, supra note 12 at 284, 285. A further reason why debt was an unsuitable
action for simple contract debt was the fact that it could only be brought in
Common Pleas where the expensive fees of a serjeant would have to be
secured. Plucknett, op. cit. supra note 22 at 410. The most important reason
why the action of debt was not satisfactory for the enforcement of simple
contract debts was that the defendant could fall back upon the wager of law.
State of New York, op. cit. supra note 5 at 103. That is, the defendant and
eleven of his neighbors could take an oath that the defendant did not owe
the -debt and that decided the case. 67 C. J. 284. This, however, could not be
done in debt on a sealed obligation. Ames, supra at 284. Nor could the wager
of law be used in assumpsit where the creditor had a right to trial by jury.24 Plucknett, op. cit. supra note 22 at 409.
1937]
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Slade's Case,25 decided in 1603, is commonly believed to be the
origin of the action of indebitatus assumpsit, but Ames points out that
the case was merely an affirmation of the rule which had existed in the
Court of Queen's Bench for over sixty years prior thereto.26 The jury
found in Slade's Case that there was no promise whatsoever, but that
there was an indebtedness. The court held that "every contract execu-
tory imports in itself an assumpsit. ' '27
The decision in Slade's Case definitely set the rule that a precedent
debt was a valid consideration to support an actionable contract. From
this time on indebitatus assumpsit was a concurrent action with debt;
it was "based on a supposed implied promise to pay the debt, in form
a kind of implied assumpsit, but in fact based on the express promise
by which the debt was created, and supported by the same considera-
tion; viz., the quid pro quo or benefit to the promisor."2 Although
concurrent with debt, the action was favored by the creditor because it
gave him the right to trial by jury, and did not allow the defendant
the wager of the law.29
The implied assumpsit was brought into use after Slade's Case to
give a remedy in another class of previously unenforceable simple con-
tract cases. These are the cases in which the plaintiff has supplied
goods or rendered services to the defendant but where no agreement
existed as to how much the defendant should pay. It is clearly seen
that there was no other common law action that would have given the
plaintiff relief.2 0 In 1609 the case of Warbrook v. Griffinn was decided;
a promise to pay reasonable value was implied in fact, and the inn-
keeper therein was permitted to recover in assumpsit against his guest.
Other cases followed, and soon the cases lined up in two distinct cate-
gories in which the courts permitted the plaintiff to recover in indebi-
tatus assumpsit: (1) recovery in that form of action upon proof of
facts from which a promise could be implied in fact; (2) recovery in
indebitatus assumpsit upon the basis of duties imposed by law, where
there was no express nor implied in fact contract 2 2 This latter exten-
254 Co. Rep. 91a, 76 Eng. Reprints 1072 (1603).
26 Ames, History of Assumpsit, (1888) 3 SELECTED ESSAYS 276-277.
27 "Every contract executory imports in itself an assumpsit, for when one agrees
to pay money or to deliver anything, thereby he assumes or promises to pay
or deliver it; and therefore when one sells any goods to another and agrees
to pay so much money at such a day, both parties may have an action of
debt or an action on the case on assumpsit, for the mutual executory agree-
ment of both parties imports in itself reciprocal actions upon the case as well
as actions of debt." 4 Co. Rep. 91a, 94a-b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1072, 1077.
2 Walsh, A HISTORY OF ANGLo-AMERICAN LAW (1932) 346.
29 Walsh, op cit. supra note 28 at 345; also, see supra note 23.
30 In such a case debt could not be used because there was no fixed sum; cove-
nant was excluded because there was no specialty; assumpsit would not be
proper because there was no express promise.
612 Browl. 254, 123 Eng. Rep. 927 (1609).
2 State of New York, op. cit. supra note 5 at 104.
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sion of the action of indebitatus assumpsit into the field of quasi con-
tract is beyond the scope of this paper. In the first category of cases,
however, may be seen the source of the quantum meruit, quantum
valebat actions of today.
Assumpsit, finally developed, was a flexible action sounding neither
in contract nor in tort; it became an independent form of action,
although at first it was merely "a special manifestation of the action
on the case. ' ' S 3 The development of indebitatus assumpsit that took
place because of the decision in Slade's Case definitely changed the
emphasis in the action of assumpsit. "In the older cases the assumpsit
merely served to prevent the defendant from saying that he acted solely
at the plaintiff's invitation and therefore at the plaintiff's risk, where
the case involved malfeasance; later when cases of nonfeasance became
actionable, the assumpsit served to show that the defendant committed
a wrong in undertaking to do a thing and failing to perform it; but
when we come to indebitatus assumpsit the promissory character of
the assumpsit is undeniable.
3 4
Mutually concurrent executory promises are undeniably sufficient
consideration to support a bilateral contract except in certain instances
where public policy declares such promises or one of them void or
unenforceable on extraneous grounds, as, for example, where the
mutual promises contemplate the commission of a crime. Naturally, the
lawyer wishes to apply the same detriment-benefit test to mutual
promises as he does to unilateral agreements. The detriment or bene-
fit is sought then in either (1) the making of the promise in fact, or
(2) the legal obligation, the nature of the act promised. Ames chooses
the former. Other authorities choose the latter. Whatever the theory,
it seems definite that a promise to do or to forbear to do an act is
just as sufficient a consideration for a promise as the act or forbear-
ance itself would be. This rule, although the most important from the
view of modem commercial transactions, has no definite historical
origin, nor is it much disputed35 Holdsworth shows that the earliest
recognition of the rule came in 1555.36
3 3 Ames, supra note 26 at 298.
-
34 Plucknett, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CoMMON LAW 410.
- State of New York, op. cit. supra note 5 at 109; Williston, CONTmACTS (1936)§§ 103, 103A-103G; for general qualifications upon the mutual promise rule
see 13 C. J. 327-341.
363 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 444, 445: "The case of Pecke v.
Redman [2 Dyer 113a, 73 Eng. Rep. 248 (1555)] was treated by Coke (in
Slade's Case) as a case which decided that a wholly executory contract was
enforceable by assumpsit; and, if the case is an authority for this proposition,
it is the earliest case in which this principle was admitted. The remark in
argument in the case of Norwood v. Reed [1 Plowden 182, 75 Eng. Rep. 278
1558)] that 'every contract executory is an assumpsit in itself' shows that the
lawyers were beginning to realize that mutual undertakings-the mutual
assumpsits-of the two parties to an executory contract would give rise to
19371
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A review of the doctrine of moral obligation as a sufficient con-
sideration to support a contract will be made elsewhere in this
paper. At present it is sufficient to say that the doctrine of considera-
tion involves three important elements: (1) a detriment to the prom-
isee incurred because of the defendant promisor (origin-special as-
sumpsit) ; (2) a benefit to the promisor (origin--indebitatus assump-
sit); (3) mutual promises (origin-unknown) .3 These are the ele-
ments of consideration. It is impossible to go further in an attempt
to formulate a complete definition of consideration, for any definition,
no matter how painstakingly it would be formulated, would be bound
to admit of some exception. To quote from Rice v. Almy, 8 an early
Connecticut case: "Probably no rule of law has given rise to a greater
multitude of cases and to a greater diversity of decisions than that
which requires that a simple contract cannot be supported without a
sufficient consideration. Many judges in giving opinions, and many
authors of text-books, have endeavored to give a correct definition of
such a consideration; but it is believed that it would be in vain to
search in the most complete law library for one that would prove to be
complete and logically accurate."
THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASES OF CONTRACTURAL OBLIGATION
It is an elemental concept that the importance of the promise of one
man to another and the necessity of its enforcement grew as society
itself evolved and became complex. In primitive time man sought his
preservation by his own hands. His food, his clothing, his shelter, all
these elemental things, were produced by his own deeds; he protected
himself from the attacks of beast and man by virtue of his own
strength and skill in combat; in a word, he lived in a state of anarchy,
independent of the help of others. As the social system evolved, man
was gradually separated from the personal necessity of seeking his
material preservation; other men intervened to lighten his task, and
soon all work was done on a cooperative or barter basis. This process
has developed, sometimes rapidly, othertimes slowly, until today the
vast field of commercial enterprise, as man knows it, the intricate,
complex and involved social and economic system in which man lives
mutual actions of assumpsit; and the principle was recognized in 1589 in
Strangborough and Warner's Case [4 Leonard 3, 74 Eng. Rep. 685 (1589)].
'Note,' it was said, 'that a promise against a promisee will maintain an action
upon the case, as in consideration that you do give me 10i on such a day, I do
promise to give you 101 such a day after'."
4 Mutual promises as a consideration may be considered merely as a refinement
of number (2) above. Ames defines consideration as any act or forbearance
given in exchange for a promise. Then upon the premise that a promise is an
act, it is possible to find consideration in every case of mutual promises. Ames,
LEcruREs ON LEGAL HISTORY 340.
38 32 Conn. 297, 303 (1864).
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makes -him utterly dependent upon the promises and undertakings of
his fellowmen.
As society grew and man became dependent upon the promises and
undertakings of others, he naturally sought security of such promises;
he demanded that they be enforced, and such demand had to be heeded
for upon the keeping of such promises and undertakings now depended
his material preservation. At first, in order to prevent a breach of
promise, the promisee resorted to self-help. But as law developed self-
help was prohibited. And so sot'ne means of enforcing a promise had to
be adopted by the law as a substitute for the primitive method of self-
help. Such means took the form of a judgment or decree-a state-
ment of a tribunal of organized society, made after due presentment
and consideration of facts, that a promise should be enforced or that
the breaker of such promise should make some sort of reparation to
the promisee for his failure to perform, the reparation usually made
by the payment of a sum of money. The judgment or decree was and
is now carried out by the very force and impetus always inherent in
organized society.
But the evolution from the period of self-help to that of the peace-
ful declaration and enforcement of promises did not occur without
the development of concurrent problems. Chief among these was the
problem which confronted every system of jurisprudence from the
outset; namely, what promises should be enforced? To the reasonable
mind conversant in some small way with the various systems of juris-
prudence existing in organized society there seems to be three possible
answers to this problem: (1) Enforce all promises regardless of char-
acter; (2) Enforce only those promises deliberately and fairly made by
the promisor with the intention that he should be bound thereby; (3)
Enforce only those promises supported by the illusive concept, con-
sideration. It is submitted that no system of jurisprudence has yet con-
sidered the first answer practicable." Some of the continental systems
adopted the second possibility, demanding as proof of such promises
the same proof as the common law demands by the Statute of Frauds.
The third answer was a development peculiar to the common law. 0
Such answer created an arbitrary division of deliberate promises which
were made by the promisor with the intention to be bound; that is,
deliberate promises which were unenforceable because of lack of con-
-3 State of New York, op. cit. supra note 5 at 167; Corbin, Nonbinding Promises
as Consideration (1926) 26 COL. L. Ray. 550.
-o As had previously been indicated, the common law came close to adopting
the second answer in the eighteenth century when Lord Mansfield suggested
that in business transactions the presence of consideration should only be of
evidentiary value as showing deliberation and intention to be bound and that
the promise should be enforceable if in writing whether it was supported by a
consideration or not.
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sideration and deliberate promises which were enforceable because of
the presence of consideration.4 '
So it is found that by viewing the law in its international aspect
two concepts of contractual enforcement have evolved which were and
still are at loggerheads with each other. One system gave wide and
efficient enforcement to promises; the other, narrower and less effec-
tive enforcement; and the student of the law "comes in both cases
upon a mixture of historical background and philosophical reasoning,
each influencing the other and neither governing the subject com-
pletely." 4 Philosophical theories were formed to explain old rules,
to make new rules, and to revise both old and new rules of the law.
"Nowhere is the reciprocal action of legal rules and philosophical the-
ories more strikingly manifest than in our law of contractual liabil-
ity."43' Some of these theories of contractual obligation will now be
considered.
It was sometimes proposed that all promises were morally bind-
ing.4 This theory bound a man in law to perform his promises because
he was so bound by the natural law; that is, all promises because they
were morally binding should be legally binding.45 The influence of this
theory was very much felt in the law. Pound explains its potency in the
following way: in early times the law did nothing to enforce promises;
that there were only three grounds for legal action--insult, injury and
homicide; the neglect of the law was the gain of the church; promises
began to be enforced under the authority of religion. However, after
the church lost its influence in these matters, the theory dwindled in
importance in its play upon the common law rules of enforcement;
this theory in modified form is, however, the basis for the modern doc-
trine of moral consideration as will be shown later.
The will theory of contractual obligation takes on two forms. One
is the subjective theory, an outcropping of the Romanizing tendencies
of the metaphysical jurists of the nineteenth century. Pound explains
this theory as follows: "Later metaphysical jurists rely upon the idea
41 The writer acknowledges the aid of Dean Pound's invaluable book, AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1925), in the preparation of the above
statement of the problem.42 Pound, op. cit. supra note 41 at 241.
4 Pound, loc. cit. supra note 42.
SThe following paragraphs were prepared with the aid of the following
authorities: Pound, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1925) 236-
284; State of New York, Legislative Document no. 65 (1936) ; Second Annual
Report of the Law Revision Commission, 167-172; Williston, CONTRACTS
(1936) §§ 99-204.
45 This theory should be distinguished from the modern doctrine of moral obli-
gation; no modern court, with possibly but one exception, recognizes the rule
that a mere moral obligation is sufficient to support any express promise. The
theory is only important as being a possible basis for Mansfield's decisions in




of personality. The Romanist thinks of a legal transaction as a willing
of some change in a person's sphere of rights to which the law, carry-
ing out his will, gives the intended effect. If the transaction is executed,
revocation would involve aggression upon the substance of another. If
it is executory, however, why should the declared intent that the
change take place in the future be executed by the law despite the
altered will of the promisor? Some say that this should be done where
there is a joint will from which only joint action may recede. Where
the parties have come to an agreement, where their wills have been
at one, the law is to give effect to this joint will as a sort of vindication
of personality. ' '  The other, and by far the most important "will
theory" is the so-called "legal transactions" theory.
The latter theory is at the root of the whole controversy over con-
sideration. In effect, the theory transcends and goes beyond the doc-
trine of consideration. It is closely allied to the theory that all promises
are morally binding. It is the basis for the continental answer to the
question, what promises should be enforced.W To state the test which
modern proponents of the theory propose: "Subject to certain quali-
fications relating to form, it should suffice for the formation of a con-
tract that there exists: (1) capacity; (2) an intention to contract; (3)
and a possible and lawful object.""
"Pound, op. cit. supra note 44 at 263-264. The author goes on to show that
such a subjective theory may easily fail to explain a transaction such as the
following: a case where an offer is made which a reasonable man would
understand in a certain way and the offeree accepts it with that understanding,
but where the offeror intended some other meaning. There is no "community
of will" in such a case and yet the law, from the objective viewpoint, would
hold that a contract existed.
47 The requirement of the existence of a sufficient causa to make a contract
enforceable in the law of such countries as Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Chile,
Columbia, France, Guatemala, Holland, Italy and Spain is in reality a non-
existent doctrine. Lorenzen, Causa and Consideration in the Law of Contracts
(1919) 18 YALE L. J. 621. Countries which wholeheartedly adopt the modem
will theory, omitting any consideration of the technical requirement of causa,
are: Austria, Brazil, Germany, Japan, Mexico, and Switzerland. Ibid., 682,
n. 10.
s Lorenzen, op. cit. supra note 47 at 646. In all of the period of English legal
history, Lord Mansfield came closer to putting this theory into practice than
any other English jurist. State of New York, op. cit. supra note 5 at 169.
The "will theory," as distinguished from other theories herein outlined, lends
no support to the doctrine of consideration as it now exists in the English
law. On the contrary, Lorenzen believes that the doctrine of consideration
cannot be justified on any theory. He says, in outlining his conclusions upon
the subject: "The Anglo-American doctrine that an agreement, in order to
be enforceable, must be clothed in a solemn form or be supported by a con-
sideration, cannot, at least as regards the element of consideration, be justified
on theory. Agreements which are physically possible and legally permissible
should, on principle, be enforceable, although there is no valuable considera-
tion, if it was the intention of the parties to assume legal relations. But the
Anglo-American doctrine limits the test of validity to either of two forms
of evidence only, out of a greater number of possible and rational forms of
evidence of true intent to assume an obligation-with results which have been
found to be unsatisfactory." Lorenzen, loc. cit. supra. By causa is meant cause,
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Lord Wright in his recent article 9 believes the test of contractual
intention should be the answer to the following question: "whether
there was a deliberate and serious intention, free from illegality, im-
morality, mistake, fraud or duress, to make a binding contract." A
restatement of the same test is proposed by Pound in possibly a slightly
variant form. His test of enforcement, although based upon the will
theory, does not completely, so he claims, adopt it. He would "enforce
those promises which a reasonable man in the position of the promisee
would believe to have been made deliberately with intent to assume a
binding relation." 50 To insure security against fraud he suggests the
adoption of requirements of proof similar to those of the Statute of
Frauds.,'
Holdsworth, while probably not adverse to any of the above pro-
posals, makes one of his own which results in sort of a compromise
between Lord Wright's position and the position of the conservative
jurists who defend the doctrine of consideration as it stands. Holds-
worth proposes that a promise should be enforced if made by the
party with the intention of affecting his legal relations: that admissible
proof of such intention is a writing or that the promise is supported
by a consideration. Holdsworth's ideas are admittedly derivable from
Lord Mansfield's proposals in Pillans v. Mierop,-52 namely, that the
presence of consideration be of only evidentiary value.5 3 Holdsworth's
test allows the enforcement of a gratuitous promise if evidenced in
writing; on the other end of the scale he permits the enforcement of
an oral promise if supported by consideration in the technical sense of
the word. To analyze the proposed test leads the student to the con-
clusion that the existence of serious intention of the promisor to bind
himself is the mainstay of the proposal, writing or consideration being
the only acceptable indicia of the presence of such intention.
reason, or motive in making a promise. It is submitted that the doctrine of
causa, like the doctrine of consideration, is merely another form of evidence
to ascertain intention to assume binding obligations; and that such doctrine as
it is applied in some civil law countries (see note 47, supra) is subject to the
same criticism that Lorenzen makes of consideration.
49 Lord Wright, Ought the Doctrine of Consideration be Abolished from the
Common Lawf (1936) 49 HAv. L. REv. 1225, 1251.
50 Pound, op. cit. supra note 44 at 281-282. Pound's theory includes in it some of
the elements of the "reliance theory" discussed below. But the intention angle
predominates.
tPound's criticism of the present system is that security against fraud is
guarded against only by the requirement of the presence of consideration
"which is easy to establish by doubtful evidence as the pro-itself."
523 Burr. 1663, 97 Eng. Rep. 1035 (1765).
538 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLIsH LAW (1926) 47. Mansfield's proposal was
limited, however, to business transactions; Holdsworth goes beyond this.
Wright, Ought the Doctrine of Consideration to be Abolished from the Com-
,mon Law (1936) 49 HARv. L. REv. 1225.
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Perhaps it is an injustice to the learned modern authors who have
made the proposals above discussed to classify them as being of the
"will" variety. Possibly a new name should be devised for these pro-
posals in order that they might be distinguished from the subjective
will theory against which much criticism has been leveled.5 For the
purposes of future distinctions in this paper the modern theories will
be designated "serious-intention" theories.
it is not the writer's purpose at this time to attempt any evaluation
of these proposals of modern jurists to broaden the bases of enforce-
ment of promises; that will be done in the fourth section of this
paper. The only object in setting them out at this time is to acquaint
the reader with them so that he may keep them in mind when the doc-
trine of moral consideration is discussed in section three of this
paper.
The bargain theory is probably the most popular common law the-
ory.5s This theory of enforcement of promises amounts to this: if the
promise does not find its origin in a bargain or exchange then it is
unenforceable as being without consideration. The bargain theory is a
test of consideration. Possibly this is best seen when Ballentine's defi-
nition of consideration is considered: "Consideration is primarily the
test of bargain, and may be defined as the thing which the promisee
gives or promises to give in exchange for the thing promised; not for
r4 One writer lists the objections to the will theory of contract as follows: "In
the first place, it is the hand-maiden, if not the offspring, of that metaphysical
philosophy of life which led men to deal in vacuous concepts rather than
realities. In the second place, the 'will' theory was found to be unadaptable
to the needs of modern commercial society; its logical application wrought
havoc with reasonable understandings of business men. Again, the 'wil'
theory was individualistic to the core, and hence out of step with the move-
ment for the socialization of law which has taken place in the last generation.
Law is no longer looked upon as a means of securing the freedom of the indi-
vidual will, but as an instrument of social control which must be adjusted
with an eye to the social consequences. Finally, the adherents of the 'will'
theory made many exceptions and distinctions in order to escape the rule of
nullity." Patterson, Illusory Pritises and Pronisor's Options (1921) 6 IOWA
L. BULL. 129, 133. This criticism is clearly not directed at the modern mani-
festations of the will theory as expounded by Pound, Lorenzen, Wright, et al.
Patterson takes his example of the will theory from the French Civil Code.
Lorenzen shows that that Code makes the presence of a sufficient causa the
test of a valid contract. "Article 1131. An obligation without 'cause' or founded
on a wrong 'cause' or an illicit 'cause' can have no effect." He later refutes
the idea that any such test as sufficient causa exists and then lays down what
he believes to be the true test. See, supra, pp. 17-18. Such true test as is pro-
posed by Lorenzen corresponds to the test adopted by the Codes of Austria,
Brazil, Germany, Japan, Mexico, and Switzerland; none of the theories pro-
posed by any of the modern writers correspond to the test of causa demanded
by the French Civil Code or any of the codes patterned therefrom. The dis-
tinction may be difficult to see, but it submitted that the causa test of enforce-
ment is as much of a technicality in the civil law as the consideration test
is in the common law. Neither test represents fully the modem theories of
Pound, et al.55 State of New York, op. cit. supra note 5 at 169.
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the promise as it is usually expressed." From the historical viewpoint
the bargain theory had its origin in the exchange of property which
was the fiction upon which the action of debt was based.67 By a process
of expansion the courts soon came to recognize contracts based on an
exchange of promises, then the exchange of a promise for a forbear-
ance, or goods, or services, or affirmative acts:" But Pound claims that
the bargain theory is now a restraint upon the courts and that they
are seeking to get away from it? 9 Courts are now enforcing subscrip-
tion contracts, gratuitous promises where the promisee has relied there-
on, promises based on moral obligations, promises to pay a debt after it
has been barred by the statute of limitations, bankruptcy etc.6° Clearly
no bargain is present in these cases.
The greatest influence of the bargain theory on the law of con-
tracts was to lessen the enforcement of contracts under seal. The
specialty at common law was enforceable because it was under seal;
the influence of this theory together with the fact that equity did not
recognize the conclusiveness of the seal was to bring about such various
limitations upon the effect of the seal as the rule that the seal is only
presumptive of consideration.6'
The bargain theory is still the prevalent theory of the common law
despite its many shortcomings. Some text writers have thought to get
away from its rigid test by combining it with the theory of equivalents
or by adopting an arbitrary classification of promises enforceable be-
cause supported by a consideration, the presence of which is tested by
the bargain theory, and informal promises enforceable without the
-56 Quoted in Ashley, The Doctrine of Consideration (1913) 26 HARv. L. REv.
429, 430. Another quoted section from Ballentine presents his idea further:
"If we rationalize the doctrine of consideration, we shall find that the appar-
ent arbitrary and technical rules of consideration furnish a touchstone or test
of two substantive qualities in the transaction, viz.: (1) Is the engagement
of the parties put on the basis of bargain, or is the real basis gratuitous?
(2) If a bargain is found, does the subject matter given in exchange have
sufficient possibility of value to be the foundation of a legitimate claim, or is
it obviously insufficient?" Ibid., 431. Ashley, in the article, criticizes Ballen-
tine's test. He says: "Consideration is not for the purpose of showing an
intended business arrangement. In fact the transaction is sometimes meant to
be gratuitous, and the requested consideration desired purely to meet the
technicality." Ibid., 431-432. Ballentine replies: "Dean Ashley asserts that this
(the bargain test) is not the reason for the rule, and seems to believe that
consideration exists for its own sake. But nothing operates as a consideration
which is not regarded or treated as an item of exchange by the parties."
Ballentine, Is the Doctrine of Consideration Senseless and Illogical? (1913),
SELECTED READINGS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1931) 588, 589. It is sub-
mitted that this last reply of Ballentine's admits of a subjective angle to the
bargain theory which, by its most ardent proponents, is claimed to be an
objective theory.
5" State of New York, op. cit. supra note 5 at 170. See supra note 6 (a).
58 State of New York, loc. cit. supra note 57.59 Pound, AN INTRODUCTON TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1925) 272.
60 Pound, loc. cit. supra note 59.
State of New York, op. cit. supra note 5 at 170.
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presence of consideration to support them.6 It is submitted that the
admitted necessity of making such a classification confesses the inade-
quacy of the bargain theory and confesses further the necessity of
formulating some new test to determine what promises should be
enforceable.
Another theory is the theory of equivalents. This theory of con-
tractual enforcement arose in the seventeenth century. "Under this
theory an abstract promise unsupported by an equivalent is not en-
forceable. One should not rely upon such a promise. Voluntary prom-
ises without equivalents are mere ostentation and do not show delibera-
tion and have no binding moral force. But when the promisee has
parted with an equivalent in exchange for a promise, or is injured rely-
ing upon a promise, that promise should be morally and legally enforce-
able."' 3
Proponents of the serious-intention theory find this theory of equiv-
alents easily adjusted to their theory. The equivalents theory goes upon
the premise that voluntary promises are merely made for "show," and
that it is the presence of an equivalent which proves that the promises
0
2 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACrS (1932) § 19 states first the requirements of the law
for formation of an informal contract: "(a) A promisor and a promisee each
of whom has legal capacity to act as such in the proposed contract; (b) A
manifestation of assent by the parties who form the contract to the terms
thereof, and by promisor to the consideration for his promise, except as other-
wise stated in sections 85-94; (c) A sufficient consideration except as otherwise
stated in sections 85-94, and 535; (d) The transaction, though satisfying the
foregoing requirements, must be one that is not void by statute or by special
rules of the common law." (It. sup.) Section 75 defines consideration: "(1)
Consideration for a promise is (a) an act other than a promise, or (b) a
forbearance, or (c) the creation, modification, or destruction of a legal rela-
tion, or (d) a return promise. (2) Consideration may be given to the prom-
isor or to some other person. It may be given by the promisee or by some
other person." Comment (b) on the above definition reads in part as follows:
"The section defines consideration in effect as the price bargained for and
paid for a promise, and in connection with section 19 states the principle that,
subject to certain exceptions, an informal promise is not binding unless an
agreed price has been paid for it. Consideration must actually be bargained
for as the exchange for the promise." Then follows "Topic 4. Informal con-
tracts without assent or consideration." Section 85: "When assent or consid-
eration unnecessary. Neither a manifestation of assent, unless the promise is
in terms conditional upon such a manifestation, nor consideration is requisite
for the formation of an informal contract in the cases enumerated in sections
86-90." (It. sup.) Then follows the enumeration of the contracts which are
enforceable without consideration. To quote merely the headings: "Section 86.
Promise to Pay a Debt Barred by the Statute of Limitations. * * * Section 87.
Promise to Pay a Debt Discharged in Bankruptcy. * * * Section 88. Promise
to Perform a Duty in Spite of Non-Performance of a Condition. * * * Sec-
tion 89. Promise to Perform a Voidable Duty. * * * Section 90. Promise Rea-
sonably Inducing Definite and Substantial Action"' This last recognizes in
some manner the reliance theory which will be discussed later. Williston like-
wise adopts the bargain theory, but makes this qualification: "Where informal
promises are binding without such a price they will be classified as promises
which are binding without consideration." Williston, CoNmAucrs (1936) § 100(2). For further comment upon this arbitrary classification see: Whittier,
Restatement of Contracts and Consideration (1930) 18 CALiF. L. Rzv. 611.
63 State of New York, op. cit. supra note 5 at 171.
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were made with deliberation and with intention to be bound. If that
is the premise, then why argue "equivalents" when the presence of
serious intention in making the promise is more in point?"
The theory of equivalents is another theory which is only able
to partially explain the practical results reached in the courts under
the consideration test. The theory explains the enforcement of real con-
tracts of debt; that is, an equivalent is present in the technical quid
pro quo which supports the enforcement of the debtor's duty to pay,
It explains the enforcement of contracts containing mutual promises;
the theory of exchange of promises is not inconsistent with the pres-
ence of an equivalent. It explains the enforcement of a specialty on the
theory that the presence of a seal acknowledges an equivalent. But the
theory fails to explain the enforcement of releases, waivers, and
options. It cannot explain why past consideration will not support a
promise when such past consideration is clearly an equivalent.6 5
The reliance theory, sometimes called the injurious-reliance theory,
was the product of the metaphysical jurists' attempts in the nineteenth
century to establish a new foundation of promise enforcement. The
late eighteenth century had seen the breakdown of the attempt to place
contract enforcement on a moral law basis. The most notable attempt
in this field at that time was Lord Mansfield's. The new foundation
emphasized the philosophy of property. A promise was looked upon as
a conveyance of one's substance, and one might alienate his services as
well as his property."6 The earliest exposition of the reliance theory
was this: "the duty of performing an agreement arises when one party
thereto begins to act under it. ' '67 The present statement of the theory
is that the promisor should be held to performance of his promise
because there has been a reliance thereon by the promisee, such reliance
resulting either in a change of the promisee's position because of the
promise (so-called promissory estoppel) or in an arousing of a "reason-
able expectation" in the promisee's mindY8
6 See Pound, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1925) 256.
5 State of New York, op. cit. supra note 5 at 171. Pound further points out that
if the equivalents theory were sound, then it would make no difference
whether the equivalent was rendered before or after the promise was given
or simultaneously with it. Pound, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW (1925) 258. Further: "The equivalent theory must wrestle at the outset
with the doctrine that inadequacy of consideration is immaterial so that the
equivalency is almost Pickwickian." Ibid., 273-274. The most serious propo-
nents of the equivalent theory is Langdell. Ibid., 259.
66 The will theory, it might be mentioned, was also built upon this new idea. The
idea being that one must will the alienation.
67 Pound, op. cit. supra note 65 at 261: Tracing the origin, the writer says of
this theory: "Juristically this seems to be a rationalization of the Roman
innominate contract. There, in case a pact was performed on one side, he who
performed might claim restitution quasi ex contractu or claim counter-per-
formance ex contractu."
6State of New York, loc. cit. supra note 65.
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This theory has been criticized on many grounds.9 Probably the
most potent argument advanced against the theory is that it does not
even go as far as the practical application of the test of consideration
as it is known today. English and American courts have long consid-
ered many promises enforceable and binding whether there has been
reliance thereon by the promisee or not.70
Many modem jurists have deplored the present state of the doc-
trine of consideration. Some attack it as being too narrow a concept
upon which to base the enforcement of promises. Others, more con-
servative, while supporting the consideration test, deplore the exposi-
tion and application of the doctrine as being far from clear 12 The
various theories of contractual enforcement as outlined in this section
are, in final analysis, merely attempts of jurists throughout the cen-
turies to clarify the law of contractual enforcement. These theories
have been more or less successful in their influence upon the com-
mon law, but not one has achieved its object, namely, that that theory
should become the prime test of enforcement; that is testified to by
the variety of decisions upon the subject. If these theories have had
any effect upon the common law, it has been in a sort of practical
way. Ashley criticizes judicial modification of the common law doc-
trine of consideration as tending toward abolishing that doctrine
entirely.73 Whether his prediction will in time become a verity rests
solely with the courts themselves. After all, it is the practical results
reached in a series of given cases which determine the state of the law.
6 9Ashley, The Doctrine of Consideration (1913) 26 HARv. L. REv. 429. Ashley
criticizes the application of the estoppel doctrine as a substitute for the
consideration test as "an unwarrantable usurpation of legislative powers by
the court." The case of Ricketts v. Scothorn, 57 Neb. 51, 77 N.W. 365 (1898),
is a good example of an application of the promissory estoppel doctrine. See,
also, Ferson, The Formation of Simple Contracts (1924) 9 CoRX. L. Q. 402,
419-420, as criticizing the "reasonable-expectation" phase of this theory:
"Some leading authorities have accounted for contract obligations on the
ground that they are the enforcement of promisors to fulfill expectations their
promises have aroused. This explanation seems to base obligations on the sub-
jective state of the promisee and is therefore open to the same practical objec-
tions that have been urged against basing them on the subjective state of the
promisor. (Ed.-will theory) A large percent of contract obligations, more-
over, come to exist at a moment before the obligee can possibly have such
expectations."
10 State of New York, op. cit. supra note 5 at 171-172.
7Ashley writes: "In spite of all that has been written and said in explanation
of the doctrine of consideration, the law is still far from clear upon the sub-ject. The courts are not consistent in their application of the rule, partly
because they are unwilling to enforce it strictly in all cases, and partly because
they are often hazy in their understanding and knowledge of the topic. All this
leads to present uncertainty and doubt. It is further true that consciously or
not the law of consideration is being modified gradually, until the present
technical requirement is likely to be entirely abolished." Ashley, loc. cit. supra
note 69.
, See supra note 72.
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That being an undeniable conclusion, then what is the object of con-
sidering and evaluating the philosophical theories advanced as pro-
posed bases for the enforcement of promises? The answer seems to
be this: the courts have found that the present state of the law of con-
tracts in regard to consideration has been a restraining force upon the
modern field of commercial enterprise; they have attempted to broaden
the field of enforceable promises74 and in so doing they have created
so many exceptions to the accepted test of consideration that they now
find that the exceptions have become the rule. It is submitted that a
rule of exceptions in time becomes no rule at all; the result, confusion.
And so many jurists today are looking for a new test based upon a
new theory which will not only explain the exceptions to the present
rule but will also create a foundation upon which to base future
determinations as to whether a given promise is enforceable. The result
is clearly predicted by Pound: "Given an attractive philosophical the-
ory of enforcement of promises, our courts in a new period of growth
will begin to shape the law thereby and judicial empiricism and legal
reason will bring about a workable system along new lines."' 5
THE DOCTRINE OF MORAL CONSIDERATION IN WISCONSIN
Wisconsin, like most states, has made little advancement in the field
of promise enforcement until recently. Of course, it adopts the com-
mon law test of consideration. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has
defined consideration, saying that-it "may consist of a benefit to the
promisor or a detriment to the promisee."7" As a corollary to that
definition the court, of course, has recognized that mutual promises
of the parties to the contract constitute a sufficient consideration7 It
is not the object of this paper to review in detail the whole application
of the doctrine of consideration by the Wisconsin court, nor to deter-
mine what the court deems to be a "legal" detriment or benefit suffi-
cient to support the enforcement of a promise; that is the function of
a digest.
4 Possibly the most forceful example of this tendency to broaden the field of
enforceable promises to meet with commercial necessity is seen in the rule
which denies to the maker of a note the defense of lack of consideration
against a holder in due course. Other examples of this tendency are too
numerous to mention.
75 Pound, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1925) 283.
76 Messenger v. Miller, 2 Pin. 60 (1847) ; Eycleshimer v. Van Antwerp, 13 Wis.
546 (1861); Gegare v. Fox River Land & Loan Co., 152 Wis. 548, 140 N.W.
305 (1913) ; Drover's Deposit Nat. Bank v. Tichener, 156 Wis. 251, 145 N.W.
777 (1914); Briggs v. Miller, 176 Wis. 321, 186 N.W. 163 (1922); Onsrud v.
Paulsen, 219 Wis. 1, 261 N.W. 541 (1935).
77Lyman v. Babcock, 40 Wis. 503 (1876); Curtis Land & Loan Co. v. Interior
Land Co., 137 Wis. 341, 118 N.W. 853 (1908); Sixta v. Ontonagon Valley
Land Co., 148 Wis. 186, 134 N.W. 341 (1912); Alexander Hamilton Institute
v. Hart, 180 Wis. 90, 192 N.W. 481 (1923); Thomsen v. Olson, 219 Wis. 145,
262 N.W. 601 (1935).
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This section is concerned chiefly with a development in the deci-
sions of the court which has taken place since 1932, a development
which has widened the field of enforceable promises, and which has
opened the doors of the court to promisees who had previously been
excluded. The development referred to is the recognition by the court
of the doctrine of moral consideration.
Historically the doctrine of moral obligation first gained promi-
nence in the eighteenth century. As has been previously noted, the
whole basis of philosophical thought of the late seventeenth and early
eighteenth centuries was one of natural law. Jurists of the period could
make no distinction between a natural and a civil obligation; they
regarded natural obligations as legal because of the very fact that they
were natural." The result of such a trend of thought as a matter of
course was the formation by continental jurists of the contractual
enforcement theory of the inherent moral force of a promise made as
such 7 9 Such theory, originating with Grotius,." was generally adopted
by continental jurists of the eighteenth century and led, in time, to
the civil law rule that a promise made with the intention to be legally
bound created a legal obligationY' The first important recognition of
this theory of enforcement in the common law was by Lord Mansfield,
who was well versed in the civil law, in the celebrated case of Hawkes
v. Saunders.82 There is a lot of loose language in this decision, and it
by no means represents the modem state of the doctrine of moral obli-
gation, but its importance to the profession lies in the fact that it is
the beginning of a trend of thought in the common law away from the
technical doctrine of consideration as a test for the enforcement of
promises; just how far that trend has gone will be seen later.
Hawkes v. Saunders was a case of a legatee under a will suing the
executrix, but in her personal capacity, upon her express promise to
pay the legacy, there being sufficient assets of the estate in her hands
so to do; the defense was no consideration for the promise. Lord
Mansfield admitted the lack of any detriment to the promisee or bene-
fit to the promisor; that the case did not fit under any test of consid-
eration then formulated. But he said: "I cannot agree to that (the
necessity of a detriment or a benefit) being the only ground of con-
sideration sufficient to raise an assumpsit." Then follows the widely
78 Pound, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1925) 252-253.
n See pp. 16-17, supra; also, Pound, op cit. supra note 78 at 259-260.OGrotius, 1583-1645, Dutch scholar, statesman and jurist; student of natural
law; one-time minister to England.
Pound, op. cit. supra note 78 at 260.
82 1 Cowp. 289, 98 Eng. Rep. 1091 (K.B. 1782). There was an earlier case in
which the doctrine was expounded, but Hawkes v. Sounders is the first exten-
sive treatment. The earlier case was Atldns v. Hill, 1 Cowp. 234, 98 Eng. Rep.
1088 (1775), a Mansfield decision.
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quoted statement setting forth in sweeping phrases the first tenets of
the moral consideration doctrine to be recognized by the common law:
"Where a man is under a legal or equitable obligation to pay, the
law implies a promise, though none were ever actually made. A fortiori,
a legal or equitable duty is a sufficient consideration for an actual
promise. Where a man is under a moral obligation, which no court of
Law or Equity can enforce, and promises, the honesty and rectitude of
the thing is consideration. As if a man promised to pay a just debt,
the recovery of which is barred by the statute of limitations: or if a
man, after he becomes of age, promises to pay a meritorious debt con-
tracted during his minority, but not for necessaries; or if a bankrupt,
in affluent circumstances after his certificate, promises to pay the whole
of his debts; or if a man promise to perform a secret trust, or a trust
void for want of writing, by the Statute of Frauds. In such and many
other instances, though the promise give a compulsory remedy, where
there was none before either in law or in equity; yet as the promise is
only to do what an honest man ought to do, the ties of conscience upon
an upright mind are a sufficient consideration." (It. sup.) 83
The broad doctrine of moral consideration was recognized in Eng-
land for about forty years after the decision of Hawkes v. Saunders in
1782.3 Whether it was Mansfield's idea that a mere moral obligation
not based on a pre-existing legal obligation barred by operation of law
would support an express promise later made is to this writer a matter
of conjecture. However, the language used by Mansfield in Hawkes v.
Saunders led the courts in several contemporaneous decisions to the
idea that an express promise founded on a purely moral antecedent
obligation was sufficient to support an assumpsit.35 As early as 1802,
twenty years after Mansfield's decision, there is found in a reporter's
note to the case of Wennall v. Adney8 6 a protest to this trend of the
courts.8 The note submits that the correct rule should be as follows:
"An express promise, therefore, as it should seem, can only revive a
831 Cowp. 289, 290, 98 Eng. Rep. 1091 (1782). Justice Buller, who writes a con-
curring opinion in the same case, said: "The true rule is, that wherever a
defendant is under a moral obligation, or is liable in conscience or equity to
pay, that is a sufficient consideration." The case held the executrix to her
promise.
84Note (1926) Corn. L. Q. 357, 358.
8 Watson v. Turner, Bull N. P. 129, 147, 281 (1767); Lee v. Muggeridge, 5
Taunt. 36, 128 Eng. Rep. 599 (1813); Note (1932) 16 MINN. L. REv. 808.
862 Bos. & Pul. 247, 249, 127 Eng. Rep. 137, 138 (1892).
8 The reporter begins: "An idea has prevailed of late years that an express
promise, founded simply on an antecedent moral obligation, is sufficient to
support an assumpsit. It may be worth consideration, however, whether this
proposition be not rather inaccurate, and whether that inaccuracy has not
in a great measure arisen from some expressions of Lord Mansfield and Mr.
Justice Buller, which, if construed with the qualifications fairly belonging to




precedent good consideration which might have been enforced at law
through the medium of an implied promise had it not been suspended
by some positive rule of law; but can give no original right of action
if the obligation on which it is founded never could have been enforced
at law, though not barred by any legal maxim or statute provision." '
The rule as submitted was adopted by the case of Eastwood v. Ken-
yone9 in 1840. The effect of Eastwood v. Kenyon was to repu-
diate the doctrine of moral consideration entirelyo insofar as it
permitted the enforcement of an express promise which was not
based on a pre-existing barred legal obligation; the case is still good
law in England9' as it is in many American jurisdictions9 2 The excep-
tions allowed by the rule as laid down in Eastwood v. Kenyon are no
longer regarded as a part of the moral obligation doctrine. Practically
all jurisdictions as a matter of course allow the enforcement of a new
promise to make good a claim barred by the statute of limitations or
discharged by bankruptcy without mentioning moral obligation. These
promises are now regarded as exceptions to the general doctrine of
consideration and are enforceable without reference to the doctrine 3
8 2 Bos. & Pul. 249, 253, 127 Eng. Rep. 138, 140 (1802).
89 11 Ad. & E. 438, 447, 113 Eng. Rep. 482, 485 (1840) wherein the above rule
is quoted verbatim and adopted.
90 Note (1926) 11 CoRN. L. Q. 357, 358.
9 8 HALSBURY's LAWS OF ENGLAND § 202, 204. But see Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre
Co. v. Selfridge & Co., Ltd., [1915] A.C. 847. In that case the plaintiff tire
manufacturer sold tires to D & Co. and exacted from them a price-fixing
agreement to the effect that D & Co. should not sell below plaintiff's list price
except in certain circumstances, and, in those circumstances, D & Co. agreed
to obtain from such sub-vendee an agreement that he would not sell below
stated list price. Defendant was such a sub-vendee, and had breached its con-
tract. P sued defendant. Held, assuming that plaintiff was an undisclosed prin-
cipal, no consideration moved from it to the defendant, and plaintiff could
not therefore enforce the promise. Lord Dunedin begins his opinion: "My
Lords, I confess that this case is to my mind apt to nip any budding affection
which one might have had for the doctrine of consideration. For the effect
of that doctrine in the present case is to make it possible for a person to
snap his fingers at a bargain deliberately made, a bargain not in itself unfair,
and which the person seeking to enforce it has a legitimate interest to enforce.
Notwithstanding these considerations I cannot say that I have ever had any
doubt that the judgment of the Court of Appeal was correct" [1915) A.C.
847, 855.9 2The majority of American jurisdictions have adopted the limitation of East-
wood v. Kenyon to the effect that in order for the subsequent express promise
to be enforceable it must be based on a pre-existing legal obligation. Union
Nat. Bank v. Hartwell, 84 Ala. 379, 4 So. 156, 158 (1888) ; Dodge v. Adams,
19 Pick. (Mass.) 429 (1837); Terry v. Terry, 217 S.W. 842, 845 (Kan. City
Ct. of App. 1919); Heckmann v. Van Graafeiland, 291 S.W. 191 (St. Louis
Ct. of App. 1926); McGuire v. Hughes, 207 N.Y. 516, 101 N.E. 460 (1913);
Pershall v. Elliott, 249 N.Y. 183, 163 N.E. 554 (1928) ; Shear Co. v. Harring-
ton, 266 S.W. 554 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924). For a complete list of these juris-
dictions see: Notes (1922) 17 A.L.R. 1299, 1318, 1333; (1932) 79 A.L.R. 1346,
1349-1352; Williston, CONTRACTS (1936) § 148 n. 1.
Vs Williston states the general rule: "The law in most of the United States, as
in England, has rejected the principle of moral consideration, even though
some exceptional cases of liability on promises made without present consid-
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But some American jurisdictions still recognize the efficacy of moral
consideration to support the enforcement of a subsequent promise, and
it is this trend which will now be considered.
The modern doctrine of moral consideration goes beyond the
enforcement of promises based upon a pre-existing legal obligation
into the field of promises where no such obligation exists. This field
may be readily divisible into three classes: (1) cases in which the
moral obligation arises from ethical considerations alone, where there
never existed any legal obligation to keep the promise and where the
promisor never received a pecuniary benefit at any time; (2) cases
in which the moral obligation arises collaterally to a fully performed
or still existing legal liability; (3) cases in which the moral obligation
arises out of and is connected with the previous receipt by the prom-
isor of an actual material or pecuniary benefit, but where there has
been no pre-existing legal obligation whatsoever."
Mere Moral Obligation. Where there is no pre-existing legal obli-
gation or any pre-existing benefit accruing to the promisor, it may be
generally stated and taken as a rule of thumb that a mere moral obli-
gation will not support an express promise. The cases have consistently
held, for example, that an executory promise to support a relative,9 5
or to pay a weekly sum to a father,96 or to pay support expenses of a
parent previously incurred by a stranger,' is not enforceable when
the only reason for enforcement is the fact that the promisor is under
a moral obligation to perform. Likewise, where there is no antecedent
statutory liability, the father of a bastard child cannot be held to a
subsequent promise to pay for the child's support when such promise
is based merely on ethical considerations aloneY8 In another class of
cases arising in this category are suits on promises to pay based on a
moral obligation arising from past illicit cohabitation. Generally, such
promises, while not unenforceable because of illegality, are unenforce-
able as being without consideration, any moral consideration being
insufficient.9  Promises made by widows or children of a deceased
eration may still exist as in the case of promises to pay debts barred by the
Statute of Limitations, or by a discharge in bankruptcy. Such cases are now
rested on other grounds and moral consideration as such is held insufficient
to support a promise." Williston, CONTICrS (1936) § 148. See also, supra, note
62 with reference to the RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS.
94Adopted from a larger classification used in the Note (1922) 17 A.L.R. 1299.
95 Cotton v. Graham, 84 Ky. 672, 2 S.W. 647 (1886).
96 Schwerdt v. Schwerdt, 141 Ill. App. 386 (1908) aff'd 235 Ill. 386, 85 N.E. 613
(1908).
97 Cook v. Bradley, 7 Conn. 57, 18 Am. Dec. 79 (1828).9sWiggins v. Keizer, 6 Ind. 252 (1855). But see Hargroves v. Freeman, 12 Ga.
342 (1852). The promise of a father to provide for his illegitimate child out
of his estate is not enforceable on moral grounds only. Steele v. Crawford,




person to pay the decedent's debts, where the deceased leaves no estate
and no other consideration exists except ethical considerations are
unenforceable.10° Promises made in consideration of a sense of duty
to pay for the promisee's losses which were incurred on the basis of
the promisor's good-faith, but bad advice, are not enforceable?"'
There are very few jurisdictions in the United States which in
any manner recognize the efficacy of mere moral consideration arising
from ethical motives alone. Two states have attempted recognition by
statute,'02 and only one state adopts the doctrine in its broadest
sense. -3 Wisconsin has clearly indicated that there must necessarily
100 Shraeder v. Fink, 60 Md. 436 (1883) ; Williams v. Nichols, 10 Gray (Mass.)
83 (1857) ; Bank of Commerce v. McCarty, 119 Neb. 795, 231 N.W. 34 (1930).
101 Morris v. Norton, 75 Fed. 912 (1896) ; but compare the result in cases where
the promisor might have been legally liable to the promisee if he had not
made the promise to pay. Hyman v. Succession of Parkerson, 140 La. 249,
72 So. 953 (1916).
102The Georgia Code (Sec. 4243) states that a strong moral obligation is suffi-
cient consideration to effect the enforcement of a promise. Early Georgia
cases followed this provision strictly. Gay v. Hamil, 82 Ga. 375, 10 S.E. 205
(1889) (wherein one partner of a firm did most of the work because the
other had disabled himself by the use of "excessive stimulants;" after the
work was done and the partnership about to be wound up, the partner who
did the least work agreed that a division of partnership assets the other part-
ner should get $80.00 per month for the past work as added compensation.
Held, under the statutory provision the existing strong moral obligation was
sufficient consideration for the promise); Lingo v. White, 26 Ga. App. 470,
106 S.E. 312 (1921) (wherein a husband who had given his wife a check for
the purpose of paying the wife's father's hospital expenses stops the payment
of the check, Held, husband liable on check). But other Georgia cases seem
to limit the operation of the statute. David v. Morgan, 117 Ga. 504, 43 S.E.
732 (1903); Helmer v. Helmer, 159 Ga. 376, 125 S.E. 849, 852 (1924). In
David v. Morgan, supra, the statute was construed as not relating "to the
moral obligation which inheres in every promise ;" that such moral obligation
refers to one supported by "an antecedent legal obligation, though unenforce-
able at the time, or by some present equitable duty."
The Louisiana Code provides that a "natural obligation" is sufficient to
enforce a promise. Williston, CONTRACrS (1936) § 149. The case of Hyman v.
Succession of Parkerson is a good illustration of the Louisiana law. Therein
an attorney, acting in utmost good faith, purchased a forged mortgage for the
plaintiff, his client. The attorney, feeling that such bad investment was his
fault, gave the plaintiff his promissory notes as a substitute for the forged
notes. The suit was by the plaintiff on the notes. The attorney's defense was
want of consideration. Held, attorney is liable on the notes. Hyman v. Suc-
cession of Parkerson, 140 La. 249, 72 So. 953 (1916). It is to be noted that
Louisiana is a civil law state.
-w Pennsylvania is probably the only common law state in which the moral
obligation doctrine exists in its broadest sense. As an illustration of just how
far Pennsylvania courts have gone in this field, the following quotation is
revealing: "The duty to perform a positive promise which is not contrary to
law or to public policy, or obtained by fraud, imposition, undue influence or
mistake, is certainly an obligation in morals, and, if so, it is sufficient con-
sideration for an express promise." Bentley v. Lamb, 112 Pa. 480, 4 Atl. 200(1886). The rule expounded, however, seems to be dicta because there were
past services in the case which might easily serve as consideration under the
true rule of moral consideration which shall be discussed later in this paper.
A later Pennsylvania case helds that a transfer of property in consideration
of love and affection or any other moral obligation is not good as against
creditors. Swartz v. Backmen, 267 Pa. 185, 110 Atl. 260 (1920).
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be a benefit to the promisor before his promise will be enforced31
Perhaps the most potent argument against allowing mere moral
obligation to support a promise is the fact that such a test "must vary
with the opinion of every individual."' 1 5 It is submitted that the test,
if allowed to stand, would in time degenerate into a philosophical
debate concerning the questions: what obligations are moral? what are
immoral? what obligations are neutral, having no moral or immoral
characteristic? Any conclusions drawn would not establish any wider
or sounder basis for the enforcement of promises than now exists.
Collateral Moral Obligation. While the rule may be stated, as will
be shown below, that moral obligation arising from the previous receipt
by the promisor of a pecuniary or material benefit is sufficient to sup-
port the promise even though there existed no previous legal liability,
such receipt, if it was given for contractual obligations performed by
the promisor at the time, generally will not support the enforcement
of his supplemental or collateral promise made after the contract is
fully performed or still enforceable. To state the rule more definitely,
promises made collateral to a validly existing or fully performed con-
tract are not generally enforceable. 0 6 It is difficult for this writer to
see the connection of these promises with the doctrine of moral consid-
eration in any manner. Is there any moral obligation which arises from
the making of a collateral promise such as this, except the inherent
moral force of that promise, if such be admitted? Even where moral
obligation arising from partly ethical motives is attempted to be used
as a basis for enforcing a promise, proponents of the test place very
little significance on the inherent moral force of the promise, except
possibly in Pennsylvania.0 7 They place more emphasis on the nature
and the cause of the promise, as, for example, motives of love and
affection, the obligation to make good another man's losses because
incurred on the promisor's advice, the obligation to provide for a past
mistress. So it would seem that where there was a legal duty to per-
form or which has been fully performed by the promisor who subse-
quently makes a collateral promise, that any moral obligation which
might arise because of a receipt of a pecuniary benefit by the promisor
14Park Falls State Bank v. Fordyce, 206 Wis. 628, 635, 238 N.W. 516 (1932).
"It is true that there are numerous cases holding that a mere moral obliga-
tion will not support a promise to pay. But it is equally true that there are
numerous cases holding a moral consideration sufficient where the promisor
originally received from the promisee something of value sufficient to arouse
a moral as distinguished from a legal obligation." The court adopts the latter
view as will be shown later.
15 Williston, CONTRACTS (1936) § 148. See Hatchell v. Odom, 19 N.C. 288,(*302) (1837).
10-See collection of authorities: Notes (1902) 53 L.R.A. 353, 358; (1922) 17
A.L.R. 1299, 1333; (1932) 79 A.L.R. 1346, 1350.107 See supra note 103; also Bentley v. Lamb, 112 Pa. 480, 4 Atl. 200 (1886).
[Vol. 21
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION
would only be co-extensive with his legal obligation then existing or
fully discharged, and would, in no event, be sufficient to support the
collateral promise. The conclusion which naturally follows is that this
second division of "moral obligations" is not moral at all, and, in final
analysis, does not extend as far as the first division of "moral
obligations."'' 5o
Moral Obligation Connected with the Promisor's Previous Receipt
of a Pecuniary Benefit, but Unconnected with a Pre-existing Legal
Obligation. This is the most important phase of the doctrine of moral
obligation. The general proposition involved herein has its origin in
the decision of Eastwood v. Kenyon." 9 That decision settled the law in
England upon the enforceability of promises based upon moral obli-
gation. It decided that promises based upon moral obligation were only
enforceable if, at sometime prior to the making of such promise, the
promisor had been legally bound to perform, but where his liability
has since been abated by statute or by some positive rule of law. The
majority of American jurisdictions adopted this general proposition." 0
Notable exceptions to the rule have been evolved by all jurisdictions;
for example, it is generally recognized that a new promise by an adult
to fulfill a contract made during his infancy is binding without new
consideration; a promise by a sane person to fulfill a contract made
while he was insane is likewise binding;" yet in neither of these cases
is there any pre-existing legal duty on the part of the promisor.
A minority of American jurisdictions have refused to follow the
Eastwood v. Kenyon rule as a limitation. They adopt that rule as far
as it goes, but they go further. It is at this point where the crux of
the moral consideration discussion is reached.
The minority jurisdictions recognize moral obligation as a sufficient
consideration to enforce a promise where the promisor, without his
request, has received a pecuniary or material benefit at some time in
the past, even though at that time he was not legally bound to any
performance. The rule, it has been said, amounts to a recognition of a
past consideration as being legally sufficient where such past con-
'10 It occurs to the writer that a good example of this conclusion would be as
follows: (1) A promises to pay B, a poor relative to whom he owes no legal
obligation to support, the sum of $500.00 per year. Going upon the assumed
premise that a mere moral obligation will support a promise, there is certainly
such a moral obligation in the case. (2) But supposing B confers a benefit
upon A in the form of services for which A has promised to pay B $500.00
per year. A is legally bound. Then subsequently A makes a collateral promise
to pay B $200.00 more each year. Disregarding any ideas about the inherent
moral force of every promise, is A's moral obligation any greater in situa-
tion (2) than in situation (1) ? Doesn't it seem logical that A's moral obliga
tion in situation (2) is only co-extensive with his legal obligation?
%09 11 Ad. & E. 438, 113 Eng. Rep. 138 (1840).
lO 6 R.C.L. 667.
=Williston, CONTRAcrs (1936) §§ 151, 155.
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sideration consisted of a benefit to the promisor and not merely a
detriment to the promisee. Five elements appear to be essential in order
to enforce an express promise under this doctrine: (1) that the past
consideration inure directly to the promisor's benefit; (2) that the con-
sideration is a benefit to the promisor and not merely a detriment to
the promisee; (3) that the benefit conferred by the promisee is not
intended as a mere gratuity; (4) that the subsequent express promise
is not of a collateral nature; (5) that the promisor is subject to a real
moral obligation under the facts of a given case.11 2
It has been held that where a new promise not within the Statute
of Frauds is based upon a previous agreement from which the prom-
isor has received a pecuniary benefit but which is unenforceable by the
promisee because of the Statute of Frauds, that the moral obligation
resting upon the promisor to make a return for the benefit received is
sufficient consideration to support such new promise."' Such a holding
might readily be made under the rule in Eastwood v. Kenyon on the
reasoning that a pre-existing legal obligation would have existed had
it not been for the positive rule of the statute. It is in the cases in
which the subsequent express promise connected with a past benefit
to the promisor is enforceable even though the statute declares the
original agreement void where the truly liberal view is adopted."' In
those cases there can be no pre-existing legal obligation whatsoever.
It is always to be kept in mind that the cases here discussed are against
the weight of authority.
Cases, under this doctrine, have also held that where the promisee
voluntarily discharges the promisor's legal obligations to other persons
for him, not, however, intending such as a gift, that a subsequent
promise to repay the promisee will be enforced."' Also, where the
promisee has voluntarily and without request beneficially improved the
promisor's land, a subsequent promise to pay the promisee has been
3-2 Note (1932) 16 MINN. L. REv. 808, 814-815.
I' Rankin v. Matthiesen, 10 S.D. 628, 75 N.W. 196 (1898).
"
4 Bagaeff v. Prokopik, 212 Mich. 265, 180 N.W. 427 (1920) ; Palmer v. Stan-
wood Land Co., 158 Wash. 487, 291 Pac. 342 (1930). It is to be noted that
in Wisconsin agreements within the statute of frauds are void. Wisconsin,
as will be shown later, ties up with the liberal view on this matter. Elbinger
v. Capitol & Teutonia Co., 208 Wis. 163, 242 N.W. 568 (1932). Two earlier
Wisconsin cases refusing to enforce a subsequent promise connected with
a void contract under the statute may be distinguished on the ground that
the promisor received no pecuniary benefit from the void contract. The cases
are: Hooker v. Knab, 26 Wis. 511 (1870); -Nichols v. Mitchell, 30 Wis. 329
(1872).
"'Price v. Towsey, 3 Litt. (Ky.) 423, 14 Am. Dec. 81 (1823); St. Nicholas
Ins. Co. v. Howe, 7 Bosw. 450 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1860); Wright v. Farm-
ers Nat. Bank, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 406, 72 S.W. 103 (1903) ; Park Falls State
Bank v. Fordyce, 206 Wis. 628, 238 N.W. 516 (1932); contra, Mass. Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Green, 185 Mass. 306, 70 N.E. 202 (1904).
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enforcedllE Where the promisee has voluntarily rendered past services
for the promisor and the promisor has benefitted thereby, the services
not intended to be a gratuity although the promisor may have at the
time thought so, a subsequent promise to pay for such services is
binding?'"
The cases here reviewed are but a few examples of the wide appli-
cation of the liberal doctrine of moral consideration, but they are
sufficient to present a general view of the doctrine, which is all this
writer can hope to accomplish. The controversy among the jurisdic-
tions in this country stated in its widest scope is just this: the strict
view recognizes the enforcement of only those promises connected
with a pre-existing legal obligation, with but several exceptions previ-
ously noted; the liberal view disregards the test of pre-existing legal
liability and seeks only the determination of the question whether the
promisor has received an actual material or pecuniary benefit.
Possibly the first Wisconsin case to mention moral obligation as a
sufficient consideration was Messenger v. Miller13 decided as early as
1847. But it is submitted that the reference was of purely accidental
character, the facts of the case failing to bear out the rule of law.
The first case to give any serious consideration to the moral obli-
gation doctrine was Frey v. City of Fond du Lac.'-"' In that case the
city council voted to pay two hundred dollars to every person who had
2ts The leading case on this angle is Drake v. Bell, 26 Misc. 237, 55 N.Y. Supp.
945 (1899), aff'd on other grounds 46 App. Div. 275, 61 N.Y. Supp. 657 (1899).
In that case a painter contracted with the plaintiff to paint and plaster his
vacant house. By mistake the painter worked on the defendant's house, with-
out the defendant's knowledge. Defendant, later discovering what the painter
had done, looked it over, got the painter contractor to reduce his bill, then
promised to pay him. The painter filed a lien against defendant's house when
the defendant failed to pay. He then assigned such lien claim to the plaintiff.
On an action to foreclose the lien, held, the promise is binding although there
was never any enforceable obligation on the defendant to pay up to that
time. As to cases dealing with the subsequent promise of a landowner to pay
a tenant for improvements which he voluntarily puts upon the land, see Edson
v. Poppe, 24 S.D. 466, 124 N.W. 441 (1910).
117 Holland v. Martinson, 119 Kan. 43, 237 Pac. 902 (1925). In that case M, a
broker, effected a real estate deal between two persons as the result of the
plaintiff's efforts. Later, M, recognizing the plaintiff's services, orally prom-
ised to split his commission with the plaintiff. The plaintiff sued on the promise
which M had failed to keep. Held, enforceable, M being under moral obliga-
tion to recognize the plaintiff's services, his subsequent promise to pay there-
for is binding. See also, Jilson v. Gilbert, 26 Wis. 637 (1870); Silverthorn v.
Wylie, 96 Wis. 69, 71 N.W. 107 (1897).
fl 2 Pin. 60, 63. (1847) "A moral or equitable obligation is sufficient considera-
tion for an assumption. * * * But there must be some benefit arising to the
defendant or some injury or loss to the plaintiff." The qualification in this
quotation is as broad as the principle stated. It substitutes the recognized
test of consideration to determine the presence of a moral obligation. It is
to be noted that even under the liberal doctrine of moral consideration a sub-
sequent promise based solely on past detriment to the promisee will not be
enforced.
n9324 Wis. 204 (1869).
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enlisted or who should thereafter enlist under certain calls in the
United State military service and be credited to the defendant city.
The plaintiff enlisted before the ordinance was voted upon. He received
one hundred dollars, and he sued for the remainder. The plaintiff
recovered in the lower court. The supreme court reversed the hold-
ing on the ground that the defendant city's promise was to pay for
something in the past and for which the city was never legally bound
to pay. The court laid down this rule: "It is a general rule that a
promise to pay for a past consideration, for which there is not and
never has been any legal liability on the part of the party promising,
does not make a contract binding in law. It is placed on the same foot-
ing with a promise which does not purport to be made for any consid-
eration at all."' 20 The court then proceeds to give approval to the
rule of Eastwood v. Kenyon as taken from a reporter's note to the case
of Wennall v. Adney.121 The case also suggests the exception in regard
to an adult's promise to pay for an obligation incurred during infancy.
The present status of this decision will be commented upon in connec-
tion with the Park Falls State Bank v. Fordyce case discussed later.
The rule as adopted in the Frey case is followed in Hooker v.
Knab122 which was a suit upon the defendant's note given to the plain-
tiff for a part of the amount claimed by the plaintiff as damages for
defendant's failure to deliver wheat under an oral purchase agreement
which was void as within the Statute of Frauds. The Frey case rule is
also followed in Melchoir v. McCarty,2 3 wherein plaintiff sued on a
subsequent promise by the defendant to pay for liquor delivered by
the plaintiff to the defendant under a contract void because the plain--
tiff sold the liquor on Sunday without a license. It was held that the
promise was not binding since there existed no past legal obligation.
Possibly the first relaxation of the strict English rule is found in
the case of Silverthorn v. Wylie2 dealing with a subquent promise to
pay for past services. The case, while it fails to discuss the moral obli-
gation angle, holds the promise binding even though the past services
were not rendered on request; the case was decided under a rule
adopted from an earlier case to the effect that "A promise to pay for
past services implies that they were rendered upon previous request,
and such services are good consideration for the promise."'212 The
implication of the case is, however, that if the record showed affirma-
1"24 Wis. 204, 206-207 (1869).
See supra, p. 32.
12226 Wis. 511, 514 (1870). See also Nichols v. Mitchell, 30 Wis. 329 (1872)
as a case identical in facts and principle.
us 31 Wis. 252, 256 (1872)
12496 Wis. 69, 71 N.W. 107 (1897).
12 Jilson v. Gilbert, 26 Wis. 637 (1870).
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tively that there was no previous request the decision would be other-
wise.
In Briggs v. Miller,1' decided by the Wisconsin court in 1922, is
found the most peculiar case in the reports in the field of consideration.
The defendant in that case was a public lecturer in the field of applied
psychology. In order to create the impression that he was honest, fair
and sincere in his teachings and in order to create public confidence in
himself, the defendant advertised that if anyone had at any time lost
any money in any of the defendant's business transactions and would
come forward and prove the same, he would immediately pay such
loss. The plaintiff presented to the defendant an unpaid note which
defendant had endorsed, which note had been given by one of the
defendant's companies and was barred by the statute of limitations.
The defendant refused to pay, and the plaintiff sued on the new prom-
ise. The trial court had overruled a demurrer to the complaint, but,
on appeal, the supreme court reversed such order, holding that on the
facts stated the plaintiff could not recover. The court refused to find
any benefit accruing to the defendant from the promise and refused
to find any detriment to the plaintiff in the mere act of accepting the
defendant's offer. The court rejected the plaintiff's claim that the
opportunity offered to the defendant to prove his sincerity and honesty
and thereby improve his financial standing was such a benefit to the
promisor as would amount to a sufficient consideration. The case has
been criticized as restricting the doctrine of consideration to a very
narrow field; that the true rule should be that "Anything which a
promisor requests is prima facie a benefit to him or he would other-
wise not request it."''
The effect of the case so far as the law of moral consideration is
concerned is of no consequence; that is to say, the case sub silento rec-
ognizes the Eastwood v. Kenyon rule, but goes off on the proposition
of just what constitutes a benefit. Its significance, however, is that it
shows just how far the court had gone up to 1922 in restricting the
doctrine of consideration. There is little doubt in this writer's mind but
that the case would be decided differently if it came before the court
today. Perhaps it was this decision that influenced the court in deciding
the later cases which will now be discussed.
In recent years the Wisconsin court has joined the liberal minority
in the controversy over the sufficiency of moral consideration to sup-
port a subsequent express promise. The position now taken by the
court is well defined. It has not by any means adopted the Pennsyl-
vania view that mere moral consideration is sufficient to support a
126 176 Wis. 321, 186 N.W. 163 (1922).
=7 Note (1922) 7 Copm L. Q. 365, 366.
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promise.12s On the other hand it has gone beyond the Eastwood v. Ken-
yon rule and has recognized the efficacy of moral consideration to
support a subsequent express promise where the promisor has previ-
ously received a pecuniary benefit even though there existed no former
legal obligation.
The first case to recognize the liberal rule was Park Falls State
Bank v. Fordyce,29 decided in 1932. In that case Van Ostrand owed
the plaintiff bank $5,000 and had given his notes to the plaintiff for
that sum. Later he sought an additional loan of $1,000 and offered
additional security worth at face value $5,800. The bank wanted the
security but did not want to increase the loan, and so the bank's presi-
dent asked the defendant, one of the bank's directors, to take over the
Van Ostrand loan, lend the debtor the additional $1,000, and take the
new collateral. The defendant refused to do this because the collateral
was insufficient, but he did take over the collateral and a new $5,000
note from Van Ostrand, paid the bank $4,000 in cash and placed
$1,000 to Van Ostrand's credit in the bank, whereupon the debtor
executed a new $1,000 note to the bank, receiving back his original
$5,000 note. All this was done for the accommodation of the bank.
Subsequently, Van Ostrand became insolvent and failed to pay the
defendant's note. Pursuant to an agreement with other creditors of
Van Ostrand the defendant surrendered his collateral. When it began
to look as though the defendant were going to lose on the note, the
plaintiff bank passed a resolution which provided for the taking up of
the Van Ostrand note held by the defendant, and paid the defendant
in full. The resolution referred to was passed by the board of direc-
tors and affirmed by blanket resolution of the stockholders who were
practically all ignorant of the real transaction at the time. Subse-
quently, upon discovering the facts, the stockholders passed a resolu-
tion directing the officers of the plaintiff bank to bring suit against the
defendant to rescind the former transaction and recover back the
money paid. The trial court judgment was adverse to the plaintiff and
it appealed. The supreme court affirmed the judgment, and, contrary to
the plaintiff's contention that the moral obligation here involved was
insufficient to support the bank's subsequent payment, laid down the
following rule: A moral consideration will support an executory prom-
ise, notwithstanding the fact that there is no pre-existing legal obliga-
tion, where the promisor has received an actual benefit in the past."0
128 See note 104.
a2 206 Wis. 628, 238 N.W. 516 (1932).
130 The court cited with approval the following cases: Drake v. Bell, 26 Misc.
237, 55 N.Y. Supp. 945 (1899) ; Farnham v. O'Brien, 22 Me. 475 (1843) ; Steb-
bins v. Crawford County, 92 Pa. 289 (1879) ; Edson v. Poppe, 24 S.D. 466, 124
N.W. 441 (1910) ; Bagaeff v. Prokopik, 212 Mich. 265, 180 N.W. 427 (1920) ;
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The defendant contended in the instant case that the rule of moral
consideration has no application at all to executed promises, and that
such was the nature of the promise involved in the case. The court
answered this contention by admitting that such rule was applicable
as between natural persons, but that officers of a bank, being similar
to trustees, may not make a gift of bank funds, and if they do, an
action for rescission may be had; therefore, the rule as to executory
promises is applicable in such a case.
The court, in the instant case, in reviewing past decisions does not
directly overrule the case of Frey v. City of Fond du Lac,:'- but limits
its application to cases where the original transaction which benefitted
the promisor was against public policy ;22 in such cases, any subsequent
promise is unenforceable. The philosopher would probably make the
distinction by saying that because the original transaction was invalid
as against public policy, no moral obligation could ever arise sufficient
to enforce a subsequent promise. As to the Frey case itself and the case
of Hooker v. Knab,"33 the principal case indicates that in neither one
did the promisor receive an actual pecuniary benefitl-4
The principal case was followed in the same term by Elbinger v.
Capitol & Teutonia Co., '3- which affirmed the rule there laid down
and applied the same to an executory promise made after the original
transaction wds void as within the Statute of Frauds. The plaintiff,
in the last case, rendered services to the defendant under an oral
brokerage contract which was void because not in writing as required
by statute.136 Subsequently the defendant settled with the plaintiff by
paying him $200 in cash and giving him a note for $146. The defend-
ant failed to pay the notes, and the plaintiff sued. The defense was
want of consideration. The court found for the plaintiff under the doc-
Mohr v. Rickgauer, 82 Neb. 398, 117 N.W. 950 (1908); Muir v. Kane, 55
Wash. 131, 104 Pac. 153 (1909). The court adopts verbatim the language of
Lord Mansfield in Hawkes v. Saunders.
13124 Wis. 204 (1869).
*13 The court has reference to the case of Melchoir v. McCarty, 31 Wis. 252(1872) where the defendant promisor received a benefit (the liquor) but
where the original transaction was illegal (sale of liquor on Sunday without
a license). Defendant's subsequent promise to pay for the liquor was not
enforced.
1- 26 Wis. 511 (1870).
1-u Consider the facts of these cases, supra, pp. 42-43, what benefit did the city
of Fond du Lac receive for its promise to pay those who enlisted in the mili-
tary service $200.00 apiece? (Frey Case). What benefit did the defendant
receive in Hooker v. Knab for his note? The writer is inclined to find a bene-
fit in the latter case; the defendant in that case gave plaintiff his note after
he had breached his contract to deliver wheat. The contract was oral and
unenforceable, but certainly if the defendant had kept his contract, he would
not have been able to sell the wheat at a higher price to others. The facts
of the case do not state that defendant did get a higher price, but the implica-
tion seems to be in the record.
135 208 Wis. 163, 242 N.W. 568 (1932).
3
6 WIs. STAT. (1935) § 240.10.
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trine of the Park Falls State Bank case.?3 Later cases in the reports
have recognized the view taken in these two decisions, but to date
there has been no further application of the moral consideration doc-
trine as there expounded.13s
A COMMENT UPON THE FUTURE OF THE DOCTRINE
The pivotal point in moral consideration, as has been repeatedly
shown, is the presence of or the lack of a pre-existing legal obligation.
The strict rule, demanding the presence of such obligation, grew out
of the moral obligation idea, but has since, in most cases, disregarded
the morality of a given situation and is applicable merely as an arbi-
trary rule, which is presumably without reason. On the other hand, the
liberal view disregards pre-existing legal obligation, demands as a test
a benefit to the promisor, and has for its acknowledged basis the moral
obligation of a man "to make return for things of value not intended
as a gift that he has accepted" and his moral obligation "to do what
he knowingly and advisedly gave one acting for his benefit and to his
own hurt to understand he would do."
But construing the narrow view in relation to its historical origin
of moral obligation, the student is in a quandary to find any greater
17The court said: "We there (referring to the Park Falls State Bank case)
repudiated, as too narrow, the principle obtaining in some jurisdictions that
in order for a moral consideration to be sufficient to support an executory
promise there must have been a pre-existing legal obligation to do the thing
promised, which for some reason, as the statute of limitations, discharge in
bankruptcy, or the like, is unenforceable. We there said that 'one ought, in
morals, to make return for things of value not intended as a gift that he has
accepted, and he ought in morals to do what he knowingly and advisedly gave
one acting for his benefit and to his own hurt to understand he would do.'
We there held that whenever the promisor has originally received value,
material pecuniary benefit, under circumstances giving rise to a moral obli-
gation on his part to pay for that which he has received, it is a sufficient
consideration to support a promise on his part to pay therefor. The mere fact
that a statute enacted for the benefit of the promisor prevents legal liability
on his part does not deprive him of the power by a subsequent promise to
assume a legal obligation to do that which an honest man should do where
no moral turpitude is involved in the transaction." Elbinger v. Capitol & Teu-
tonia Co., 208 Wis. 163, 165, 242 N.W. 568, 569 (1932).
135 See Goldman v. Schmid, 209 Wis. 71, 244 N.W. 586 (1932) which recognized
the rule in the Elbinger case but refused recovery to the plaintiff real estate
broker who sued on a subsequent promise (a note) to pay commissions due
under a void contract on the ground that the plaintiff broker had been faith-
less to the interests of his principal. In Johnson v. Crook, 216 Wis. 534, 257
N.W. 453 (1934) the rule in the Park Falls State Bank case was held inap-
plicable, the court failing to find any moral obligation on the part of the
promisor at all. In Onsrud v. Paulsen, 219 Wis. 1, 261 N.W. 541 (1935) the
court quoted extensively from the Park Falls State Bank case on the sub-
ject of consideration, but other consideration was found in the facts to sup-
port the enforcement of the note there involved
An interesting sidelight is the case of Webb v. McGowin, 168 So. 196
(Ala. App. 1935), aff'd 232 Ala. 374, 168 So. 199 (1936) which holds
that a subsequent promise to pay a promisee who had saved the promisor
from injury by a falling block of wood and who was himself injured by the
act was binding. The Park Falls State Bank case is cited as authority therein.
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degree of moral obligation behind the promises enforced under that
rule because they are supported by a pre-existing legal duty on the
part of the promisor than behind the promises enforced under the lib-
eral rule as adopted in Wisconsin. To the practical mind the moral
obligation in both cases is of the same force. The only distinction that
one may readily draw from the two rules is that in one, the strict rule,
there was at one time the element of bargain, while in the other, the
liberal view, there was never any bargain existing at any time. But
the absence of the bargain element in a test of promise enforcement is
not by any means an innovation when one considers the recognition by
the courts of the doctrine of promissory estoppel as a test of enforce-
ment0 39
And so it is submitted as an irresistible conclusion that either view
of the moral consideration doctrine is as much beyond the scope of the
technical rule of consideration as the other. Viewed from the stand-
point of the philosophical theories of contractual obligation heretofore
reviewed, the doctrine of moral consideration seems to be based upon
two of these theories. One finds primarily the theory of equivalents in
the requirement of a benefit to the promisor; historically, of course,
one finds the theory that all promises are morally binding as the begin-
ning of the natural-law foundation of the doctrine.
The equivalent theory of enforcement, as has been shown, goes
upon the premise that voluntary promises are merely made for osten-
tation, and that the presence of an equivalent is merely a test of serious
intention. So what the doctrine of moral consideration really amounts
to is nothing more than a single phase of the serious-intention pro-
posal. What then is the practical effect of the recognition by minority
jurisdictions of the liberal view?
The student has but to review the history of consideration as here-
tofore outlined to realize that the development in the common law of
the technical test of consideration was purely accidental. If the action
of covenant had not been so bound up with actions concerning land,
the requirement of the seal might well have become obsolete, and the
courts would not have felt the necessity for the test and would have
recognized the enforcement of the parol or unsealed covenant without
regard to consideration. 40 But the fact is that the doctrine did develop
and has been carried on by the very force that keeps other obsolete
rules alive in the law, namely, precedent.
The rule of necessity of consideration is beset with many evils.
Man's existence depends upon the enforcement of contractual obliga-
tions, yet the technical test of consideration is today being used by the
- See discussion of the reliance theory, supra, pp. 25-26.
4o See supra note 6 (b).
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legal profession to allow a man to escape from his contractual obliga-
tions just as it sometimes uses the due-process clause of the Constitu-
tion to allow a man to escape his social obligations. Wisconsin, by
adopting the liberal doctrine of moral consideration, is merely attempt-
ing to establish a broader basis of contractual enforcement. A con-
servative jurist might well complain of this as judicial legislation. But
the fact remains that the necessity of enlargement is present, and
whether the solution is to come from the bench or from legislative halls
seems immaterial in this case.
SOLUTIONS OFFERED
The extension of the moral consideration test is the easiest solution
to put into effect for all it amounts to is continued recognition of the
present test of consideration together with the universal recognition
of the liberal doctrine of moral consideration. This writer submits that
to allow the extension of the doctrine of moral consideration is to
admit into the law a "subjective cloudland" of argument over what
constitutes a past benefit to the promisor sufficient to arouse a moral
obligation on his part. Proponents of the solution may say: why not
let the courts decide what benefits are sufficient to arouse a moral
obligation for that is what the courts have been doing to date, any-
how? The answer seems apparent from the very question propounded;
differing ideas of morality are as prevalent on one side of the bar
as on the other. Further, the solution fails to answer the problem of
what should be done about promises made with the serious intention
of being legally bound where no question of moral obligation is
involved. Should the solution go a step further and recognize the
inherent moral force of all promises? One would hardly recommend
such a procedure.
As a solution, several states have enacted statutes. declaring written
contracts to be presumptive of consideration.' 4 ' Lord Mansfield was
the first to suggest this solution in the case of Pillans v. Mierop.a1
However, Mansfield's idea went far beyond most present day statutes
because he proposed that no agreement could fail if it were in writing.
The statutes have added the word "presumptive" and therein lies the
fallacy of this proposal. This solution is open primarily to two objec-
tions: (1) the statute usually fails to state the nature of the presump-
tion, that is, whether the presumption is rebuttable or conclusive;
(2) the statute usually fails to state the essentials of a written con-
tract, that is, is a note or memorandum sufficient, must it be subscribed
'14 Williston, CONTRACTS (1936) § 218.
1423 Burr. 1663, 97 Eng. Rep. 1035 (1765).
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or signed by the party to be charged, or will proof of oral assent to a
written contract suffice?
The Written Obligations Act is an act approved by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1925. The
Act, drafted by Williston, is in effect a practical application of the
serious-intention theories of Lorenzen, Pound, and Wright.4. The
reasons for the adoption of the Act are stated by the Conference as
follows: the common law provided for the enforcement of releases
and promises even though gratuitous if made under seal. The technical
rules of the common law concerning the seal, such as what constituted
a seal, soon became obnoxious and frequently worked injustice. The
American jurisdictions, as a result, either abolished the seal entirely,
modified its efficacy, or left the law as it was. This split in authority
led to confusion in an important field of commercial law. The purpose
of the Act is not to re-adopt the common law seal, but to reach a
similar result and at the same time avoid the technical common law
rules concerning the seal?"
The text of the Act as proposed is as follows: An Act to Validate
Certain Written Transactions Without Consideration, and to Make
Uniform the Law Relating Thereto. Section 1. A written release or
promise hereafter made and signed by the person releasing or prom-
ising shall not be invalid or unenforceable for lack of consideration,
if the writing also contains an additional express statement, in any
form of language, that the signer intends to be legally bound. * * *
Section 4. All acts or parts of acts inconsistent with this act are hereby
repealed. * * *145
To date the Act has been adopted in only two states, Pennsylvania
and Utah?"
When one attempts to draw any conclusions in this field or to
make any substantial proposals of a test for promise enforcement,
he is confronted at the outset with Dean Pound's prediction: "Given
an attractive pholosophical theory of enforcement of promises, our
courts in a new period of growth will begin to shape the law thereby
and judicial empiricism and legal reason will bring about a workable
system along new lines."
Likewise, he is confronted with the realization that the greatest
liberal minds of the century have pondered the problem and have
utterly failed to accomplish any practical results; there has been uni-
'1a See supra pp. 17-20.
144 Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, 1925, 584-585; for an interesting discussion concerning the adoption of
the Act, see the minutes of the 1925 conference, pp. 193-215, 303, 308; also,
see Williston, CoNTRAcTs (1936) § 219A.
'* Handbook, etc. (1925) 584.
a Handbook, etc. (1935) 353.
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formity of thought of course, but one finds nothing but utter chaos in
the practical application of any uniform test of promise enforcement;
the law and the justice it metes out is ponderous and slow-moving;
new ideas and proposals find a practically insurmountable obstacle in
the doctrine of stare decisis; the law, and it is not for this writer to
say that it is not a good thing, is not subject to every wind that blows
or to every foolish whim that might obsess the mind of an overzealous
jurist. But, nevertheless, it is only through these new proposals, new
winds, so to speak, that any changes, any progress is made in juris-
prudence. New proposals, even though they border upon sheer
idiocracy, keep the active legal mind at work; and when the chaff is
separated and thrown on the scrap heap, the kernels that come out
add to the law and make for progress.
And it is with this idea always foremost that the following con-
clusion is drawn: this writer, after much serious consideration, is
inclined to adopt that manifestation of the serious-intention theory
previously discussed known as the Uniform Written Obligations Act;
that such rule be superimposed upon the present doctrine of considera-
tion with this result: on one end of the scale, no promise will be unen-
forceable if reduced to writing, the safeguard being the necessity of the
promisor to make the additional written statement that he intends to
be legally bound; that will make him pause and think, thus preventing
any rash promises. At the other end of the scale, as Mr. Holdsworth
suggests, oral promises will be enforced only if supported by the
technical concept of consideration. In a word, only two indicia of seri-
ous intention to be legally bound should be acceptable to the courts;
namely, a writing or consideration.
